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Abstract
We propose a notion of information based abstraction for the logical study of security
protocols and study how protocol actions update agents' information. We show that
interesting security properties of Needham-Schroeder like protocols can be veried
automatically.
1 Background
The design of cryptographic protocols involves complicated exchanges of mes-
sages between agents to try and achieve secrecy of information and authen-
ticity of communication. Despite considerable ingenuity on the part of the
designers of these protocols, many possible attacks are often discovered later.
Interestingly, most of these attacks are independent of the encryption schemes
used, but rely on logical design aws, and use intruders' abilities to replay old
messages, forge addresses etc. Therefore, in recent years, a number of re-
searchers have proposed formal verication of such protocols.
The BAN logic [BAN89] is widely held to be the initiator of logical studies
of security protocols. It proposed a transformation of security protocols to a
special form and then used special rules to analyze them. The logic proposed
was a modal logic of belief, based on notions of trust between principals. While
it was criticized extensively for its inability to express certain events ([BM93],
[Nes90]), it provided a basis on which renements like ([Bie90], [Mo99b]) could
be built.
Approaches based on theorem proving ([Bol97], [Pau98]), as well as model
checking ([Mea92], [Low96], [KW96], [MCJ97]), have been used for security
protocol verication. Invariably, while the advantage of using formal logics for
this purpose is that it provides a good framework for detailed analysis of the
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structure of such protocols, the diÆculty is that logics are useful only when
the semantics is precise, and most of the problems seem to relate to precise
and detailed modelling of notions like authentication, trust etc.
A host of approaches based on process calculi ([AG97]), term rewriting sys-
tems ([GK99], [JRV00]), tree automata ([Mo99a], [Gou00]), multiset rewriting
([DLMS99], [CDLMS99], [DM99]) etc address the question of modelling pro-
tocols. These dier on what set of messages an intruder can construct at
any step of the protocol, assumptions about the environment, the capabilities
available to intruders, etc. The approach of [DMTY97] studies the roles played
by principals in leaking information to intruders and uses them to generate
inference rules then used in automatic verication.
In this paper, we attempt to combine the simple and precise features used
in these recent models of security protocols with the older style of BAN-like
logics [GNY90], [SvO94]. We do not use epistemic notions like belief, trust etc,
but present an information based abstraction for modelling the reasoning that
is typical of security protocols. Though we do present a verication result,
our emphasis is not so much on nding aws in specic protocols, but rather
on setting up a logical framework with very simple primitives which is easy to
reason in. We believe that the approach contains the rudiments for reasoning
about both authentication protocols as well as access control models [Mc94] in
one framework; however, in this account, we focus only on message exchanges
meant to ensure secrecy and authentication.
To ilustrate the essential features of this abstraction, consider the following
(very) simple protocol between two principals A and B.
A! B : fxg
B
B ! A : fxg
A
This is read as follows: A sends to B her secret x encrypted with B's public
key. It is assumed that A has `generated' a `fresh' instance of x and hence can
assume that no agent in the system has access to x. After the rst message,
A cannot be sure that B receives the message; a hacker H may well block the
message. However, there is something that A can be sure of: under the perfect
encryption assumption, only someone who has access to the inverse key of B's
public key can decipher the ciphertext and get x. Thus if B's inverse has not
been leaked, A can be sure that only B can rst decode the message.
Coming to the second message, it stands for B sending a message to A
with content x encrypted with A's public key. However, A has no way of
determining that the message does come from B, since a hacker could be
pretending to be B. Nevertheless, from the fact that the message content is
x, A can be sure that B has indeed got the information x.
Thus if A gets the second message at all (since a hacker could block it),
then A gets the information that B has seen x. On the other hand, B does
not have the information that A has x, since a hacker could be posing as A.
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Consider the following attack:
A! B(C) : fxg
B
C ! B : fxg
B
B ! C : fxg
C
(C)B ! A : fxg
A
The hacker C rst blocks A's message. Though C cannot decrypt the
message, he can pass it on to B as his own. Given such a possibility, B cannot
tell whether the message came from A or C and hence does not have the
information that A has x. Now B follows the protocol and responds with the
secret to C. At this point, C has learnt the secret and can further mislead A
by pretending to be B and `conrming' to A as required by the protocol.
Note the role of the secret x; when sent by A encrypted with B's key, it
serves to inform A that any later receipt of x from anyone adds the information
that B has seen x. Indeed, roughly speaking, in cryptographic protocols, this
is the typical way one agent gains access to information about another agent's
state.
The model we propose in this paper concentrates on this aspect of commu-
nications. We dene possible information states of systems over a vocabulary
of secrets and dene rules for how such information can be updated. Any
security protocol can then be seen as generating runs of such an information
transition system. However, along with the intended run, there can be many
unintended variants due to hacks, leaks etc. We would like to ensure that all
these variants do satisfy a given security specication. We propose a proposi-
tional modal logic with information modalities in which such specications can
be expressed. The semantics of the logic mirrors the structure of information
transition systems closely enough so that verifying that a protocol satises its
logical specication is easy.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the main
semantic structure of information transition systems and explain the design
choices that underlie the denitions. We then show how security protocols
can be `compiled' into the low-level transition systems. Later, we present our
logic with information modalities, show examples of reasoning in the logic
and present the main result that the verication problem is decidable. We
conclude the paper with a discussion of issues left unstudied here.
2 Information systems
We x a nite set Ag of agents in the system. Ag is intended to include the
principals of protocols as well as the intruders. (As we will see later, much of
the reasoning can be carried out with the assumption of one intruder, but we
will keep the generality of this framework for convenience.) We use A;B; : : :
etc to denote agents in Ag. (Without prejudice, we will refer to an agent's
information as \its" information from now on.)
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We further x P , an at most countable set of basic information terms.
These can be thought of as basic secrets. We will treat them as atomic propo-
sitions that can be true or false. However, in the context of most protocols,
these will stand for nonces; we may think of the proposition asserting that
such a nonce has been generated `afresh'. A locality map  : P ! Ag
will be used to specify which secret is local to which agent. Thus, sys-
tems will be parametrized by the tuple (Ag; P; ). Let P
A
denote the set
fp 2 P j (p) = Ag.
From P , the set of basic information terms, we can build a set of complex
terms by the following syntax. I, the set of all information terms (items), is
given by:
 2 I ::= p 2 P j ()
A
j f
1
; : : : 
k
g
A
(k > 0) j A : 
where A 2 Ag. ()
A
stands for the information  received from an agent who
is possibly A. The term A :  attests to the information that A has  (in its
database). f
1
; : : : 
k
g
A
refers to a set of information terms together encrypted
with A's public key. This serves two purposes: not only will this enable only
A to `see' the contents of this item, but will also provide the guarantee that
once A sees one of them, it will see them all. We refer only to public keys
here, but the framework can be easily extended to include shared keys as well.
For an information item  and A 2 Ag, we dene ST
A
(), the set of
subterms visible to A, in an inductive manner as follows:

ST
A
(p) =
8
<
:
fp;A : pg if (p) = A
; otherwise

ST
A
(()
B
) = f()
B
g [ f(
0
)
B
j 
0
2 ST
A
()g

ST
A
() =
8
<
:
fg [ ST
A
(
1
) [ : : : ;[ST
A
(
k
) if A = B
fg otherwise
where  = f
1
; : : : ; 
k
g
B
.

ST
A
(B : ) =
8
<
:
fB : g [ f
0
; B : 
0
j 
0
2 ST
B
()g if A = B
fB : g [ fB : 
0
j 
0
2 ST
B
()g otherwise
For   I, dene ST
A
()
def
= f
0
j 
0
2 ST
A
() for some  2 g.
Denition 2.1   I is dened to be an information state if ST
A
()  ,
for every A 2 Ag.
Information states can be seen as a complete description of all the infor-
mation available to agents in the system. Note that if A :  2  then  2 .
This reects our intention that agents have only denite information in any
state. Let  denote the set of all information states. We will often refer to
information states simply as states.
Denition 2.2 Let  2 . The database of A in , denoted A :  is dened
92
Ramanujam, Suresh
by: A : 
def
= f; A :  j A :  2 g. The information purportedly from A in ,
denoted 
A
is dened by: 
A
def
= f j ()
A
2 g. The information meant for A
in , denoted fg
A
, is dened to be the least state containing f j fg
A
2 g.
Proposition 2.1 For all states , A :  and 
A
are also states.
The set of legal message items for A in state  is the least subset X of I
such that:

A :   X and

if 
1
2 X; : : : ; 
k
2 X for k > 0, then for all B 6= A, f
1
; : : : ; 
k
g
B
2 X.
These are the messages that A could `legitimately' send in that state.
On the other hand, if A were an intruder, it could send any message
constructed from the information it has in its database. The set of general
message items for A in state  is the least subset X of I such that:

A :   X,

if  2 X, then for any B, B :  and ()
B
are also in X, and

if 
1
; : : : 
k
2 X for k > 0, then for any B, f
1
; : : : ; 
k
g
B
2 X.
Note that an intruder cannot construct the basic secrets of other principals,
unless it has already acquired them by explicit communication.
We now dene information updates. For this, we rst consider a set of
extended names. Let Ho;Ha  Ag be given such that Ho 6= ;; Ha 6= ;
and Ho\Ha = ;. Ho stands for the `honest' principals and Ha for `hackers'.
The set of extended names Ex is given by: Ex = Ho [ Ha [ f(C)A j
A 2 Ho;C 2 Hag[ fA(C) j A 2 Ho;C 2 Hag. Here, (C)A stands for the
intruder C forging A's address and sending a message in A's name. A(C)
stands for the intruder C intercepting a message meant for A and blocking A
from getting it.
The update alphabet (also referred to as action alphabet) is the set U =
P [Snd[Rec, where Snd, the `send' alphabet, and Rec, the `receive' alphabet
are dened as follows.
Snd = f(A!B; ); ((C)A!B; ) j A 2 Ho;B 2 (Ho [Ha); C 2 Hag.
Rec = f(A?B; ); (A?B(C); ) j B 2 Ho;A 2 (Ho [Ha); C 2 Hag.
We read (X!B; ) as a message sent by X, intended for B, with content .
Similarly, (A?X; ) is a message received by X, with A in the \from" address
and content . p 2 P can be thought of as notation for new(p), meaning that
the agent (p) has `generated' a fresh instance of secret p.
We now have some denitions that relate to the process by which an agent
A sends information out to another agent B and obtains conrmation that
B has indeed got it. Crucially, when A sends fp; qg
B
and later sees (p)
C
, it
conrms not only that B has got p but also that B has got q. This gets tricky
when we consider terms like ffp; qg
B
; fp; rg
C
g
D
.
We rst impose a graph structure on information terms. For this, dene
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
1
A
)
2
i 
2
2 ST
A
(
1
). Let )
def
= (
[
A2Ag
A
))

. The )-maximal elements
of I are of the form p or (   ((p)
A
1
)   )
A
k
for some p 2 P , k > 0, and
A
1
; : : : ; A
k
2 Ag.
While the chains given by maximal elements as above indicate possible
sequences of communications, they are not of much use in the process of
conrmation. For instance, if A sends fpg
B
and later receives (((p)
C
)
D
)
E
from someone, this conrms the fact that B has got p, but not that B has
(p)
A
, or even that B has p in its database. This is because B cannot be sure
that p was indeed sent by A, and must consider the possibility of (p)
D
for
any agent D. Hence A can only infer that B got p from `someone' and would
assert it in its database. Suppose B : p

stands for the information that B
received p from some agent (possibly by a sequence of communications); then
A : B : p

could be asserted on conrmation. In eect, we get A : B : (p)
D
for
any D, since none of this is denite. Rather than clutter up states with such
items. we prefer to add a new syntactic construct ()

, with the remark that
it can be eliminated.
Let ()

be an item whenever  is an item; extend the denition of ST
A
by: ST
A
(()

) = f()

g [ f(
0
)

j 
0
2 ST
A
()g. In addition, 

2 ST
A
(()
B
),
for any A;B. Note that Proposition 2.1 is still true under this extension.
For  2 I and X  I dene " (;X)
def
= f
00
= f
1
; : : : ; 
k
g
A
j  ) 
00
)

0
, where 
0
2 X, A 2 Ag; 
1
; : : : ; 
k
2 Ig.
Denition 2.3

We say that p is fresh for A in an information state  i:
p 2 P
A
, A : p 2  and for all  2  such that  ) p, the only agent
mentioned in  is A.

p marks  for A in  i:
 A 2 Ho and p 2 P
A
,
  ) p and p occurs only encrypted in ,
 for all A : 
0
2 , 
0
6) (p)

,
 A :  2 , and for all A : 
00
2  such that 
00
) p,  ) 
00
.

A conrms X in  i for all  = f
1
; : : : ; 
k
g
C
2 X, A : C : ()

2 .
Denition 2.4 An update relation R
u
is a subset of (  U  ) which
satises the following conditions:

If (; (X!Y; ); 
0
) 2 R
u
or (; (X?Y; ); 
0
) 2 R
u
, then for all A 2 Ag,
(A : 
0
)  (A : ) [ ST
A
().

If (; p; 
0
) 2 R
u
(where (p) = A), then p is fresh for A in 
0
and for all 
such that  6) p,  2  i  2 
0
.

If (; (A!B; ); 
0
) 2 R
u
, then
 for all D 2 Ho such that D 6= A, D : 
0
= D : ,
  is a legal message term for A in ,
 A : 
0
= A :  [ ST
A
(), and
 for every C 2 Ha,  2 C : 
0
.
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
If (; (A?B; ); 
0
) 2 R
u
, then
 for all D 2 Ho such that D 6= B, D : 
0
= D : ,
 B : 
0
= B :  [ ST
B
(()
A
), and
 for all p such that (()
A
B
)(p)

and p marks 
0
in ), B conrms " (
0
; X)
in 
0
, for some X  Y , where Y is the set of minimal encrypted subterms
of 
0
containing p.

If (; ((C)A!B; ); 
0
) 2 R
u
, then  is a general message term for C in 
and for every D 2 Ho, D :  = D : 
0
.

If (; (A?B(C); ); 
0
) 2 R
u
, then for every D 2 Ho, D :  = D : 
0
.
Denition 2.5 An information system S over U is given by a pair ( ; R)
where     is the set of states of S and R is any update relation on  .
A sequence  2 U

is admissible for S if it denes a run on S. Let Adm(S) be
the set of all sequences admissible for S.
3 Protocol descriptions
Security protocols are typically specied as sequences of communications of the
form A  ! B :M , whereM is a message which is typically a nonce or a set of
nonces, possibly encrypted with B's public key. This is an abstract description
that hides details like whether messages are delivered instantaneously or suer
delays, whether they are delivered in order or out of order etc. More crucially,
exception handling details like what an agent should do when it expects a
message of a kind and gets another one, are left implicit. Of course, this has
a bearing on the verication of such protocols. Nevertheless, crucial design
problems can be captured even at this level of abstraction.
While retaining this model of a protocol, we focus our attention on how
agents' information gets updated during the course of protocol execution, in-
cluding hacked variants of admissible sessions. For this purpose, we generalize
the message alphabet to contain all information terms. Therefore it is possible
for the protocol to include communications like: A  ! B : f(C : p)
D
g
B
.
These correspond to terms like D said that C has p [BAN89]. While most ex-
tant protocols do not demand such a sophisticated message mechanism, many
do incorporate names inside messages, which constitute information terms. As
we will see, the full generality of information terms gives rise to more mutual
information properties being realised by protocols.
We will make a crucial assumption that the designated principals always
follow the protocol. Thus system behaviours will be constructed in such a
way that `honest' principals take actions according to protocol and update
their information according to set rules, whereas intruders are (obviously)
unconstrained thus.
Formally, a protocol alphabet  resembles the set of extended names. It is
parametrized by a pair (Ho;Ha) (for convenience, assume: Ho [Ha = Ag),
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and is given by the set 
def
= fX  ! Y :  j  2 I; X 2 fA; (C)Ag; Y 2
fB;B(C)g; A;B 2 (Ho [Ha); C 2 Hag. A communication  = X  ! Y : 
is said to be principal if X;Y 2 Ho.
Since we wish to consider hacked variants of messages, we need to specify
how an intruder can modify the content of messages. Given an information
element , which is a legal message term for some principal and C 2 Ha ,we
dene V
C
() to be a set of `C-variant' terms dened inductively as follows:
V
C
(p) = fpg [ P
C
; V
C
((
0
)
B
) = f(
00
)
D
j 
00
2 V
C
(
0
); D 2 Agg; V
C
(fXg
B
) =
ffXg
B
g; V
C
(B : 
0
) = fD : 
00
j 
00
2 V
C
(
0
); D 2 Agg. Now, for X  I,
g
C
: X ! I is said to be a message variant map for C if for all  2 X; g
C
()
is in V
C
().
A protocol is specied by a principal session which is a nite non-null
sequence of principal communications Æ = 
1
: : : 
k
, k > 0. Let X be the
set of all information elements used as messages in the communications in Æ.
Let H be the set of all agents who either send or receive messages in Æ and
let T
1
; T
2
 H such that T
1
[ T
2
 H and T
1
\ T
2
= ;. For C 2 Ha, x
a message variant map g : X ! I; a (T
1
; T
2
; C; g)-variant of Æ is dened as
follows: If 
j
= A  ! B : , a communication 
0
= X  ! Y : g() in
the protocol alphabet  is said to be a (T
1
; T
2
; C; g)-variant of 
j
if (A 2 T
1
impliesX = (C)A), (B 2 T
1
implies Y = B(C)), (A 2 T
2
impliesX = C), and
(B 2 T
2
implies Y = C). This is easily extended to sequences. A (T
1
; T
2
; C; g)
variant of Æ is a session where C plays the role of agents in T
2
in its own name,
and plays the role of each agent A 2 T
1
assuming A's name.
Let M
Æ
denote the set of all (T
1
; T
2
; C; g)-variants of session Æ, for all
(T
1
; T
2
; C; g). The variants in M
Æ
are referred to as mono-sessions dened
by Æ. A general session of Æ is an interleaving of a nite set of mono-sessions
M of Æ. Let P
Æ
denote the set of all general sessions of Æ.
Thus, given a security protocol Æ 2 

, we have, associated with it, a lan-
guage P
Æ
 

. However, since we have dened updates separately for sends
and receives, we need to split communications: X  ! Y :  is translated to
(X!Y; )(X?Y; ). In addition, we prex each general session with a sequence
of new(p) updates for all secrets p used in that session. This is extended
pointwise so that P
Æ
denes a subset of P
0
Æ
of U

. The language generated by
Æ with respect to an information system S = (; R), denoted Lang(S; Æ), is
dened to be P
0
Æ
\ Adm(S).
The following lemma is easily shown:
Lemma 3.1 Given a protocol Æ 2 

and an information system S, there
exists a nondeterministic nite state automaton N over alphabet U such that
L(N) = Lang(S; Æ).
The construction of such a protocol automaton associated with Æ is simple.
We rst synthesize the set of information states that the automaton needs. For
this we rst need to add information elements specied by Æ; (for instance, if Æ
has a communication A  ! B : fg
B
, then we must add A : fg
B
, A : B : ()

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etc.) Then we close the space under subterms, and under all C-variants, for
C 2 Ha. But this makes the space innite. We observe that the structure
of Æ allows us to equate behaviours in such a way that it suÆces to consider,
for any C 2 Ha, C-variants from some nite subset of P
C
. This allows one
to work with quotiented information states, the size of which is bounded by a
function of the size of Æ. This gives us a nite set of automaton states, which
also additionally possess control information to code up which part of the
protocol is completed and what is left. Further, the structure of Æ (alongwith
its hacked variants) species the set of transitions for the automaton. Final
states are identied by the completion of communications specied by Æ. The
details are somewhat tedious but straightforward.
As it happens, when we consider the verication problem, the security
specication will also give us a nite subset of P
C
for any hacker C, such that
we need to consider only C-variants built from this nite set, thereby making
the state space of the constructed automaton nite. Hence, we will not need
the quotient construction outlined above, but a simpler one will suÆce.
The automaton mentioned in the lemma is only intended to give a ma-
chine representation of general sessions, and is distinct from the kind of tree
automata used by others ([Mo99a], [Gou00], for example). There, the tree
automata are used to provide a succinct, automatically updatable represen-
tation of intruders' knowledge at each state. The automata studied here can
be enriched so that every state contains a tree automaton to obtain such a
detailed representation.
4 Logic
We now introduce the logical language in which security properties can be
specied. We have a propositional modal logic, the modalities of which reect
the information structures that we have seen so far.
The logic is parameterized by (P;Ag) where P is the set of basic informa-
tion terms (secrets) and Ag is the set of agents. The logic is presented in two
layers: we have two syntactic categories of formulas in the logic, that of state
formulas and that of session formulas.
The syntax of state formulas is given by:
 2 	 ::= p 2 P j : j  _  j from
A
 j for
A
 j A : 
where A 2 Ag. Note that these formulas correspond to information elements:
from
A
 asserts the existence of information  that has come from an agent
who is possibly A; for
A
 refers to an item whose content is available only
for A; the formula A :  attests to the denite information  being available
in A's database.
The semantics formalizes the intention described above. We dene the
notion  j=
i
 inductively below, where  is a state and  is a state formula:

 j=
i
p i p 2 .
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
 j=
i
: i  6j=
i
.

 j=
i
 _  i  j=
i
 or  j=
i
.

 j=
i
from
A
 i ()
A
j=
i
.

 j=
i
for
A
 i fg
A
j=
i
.

 j=
i
A :  i A :  j=
i
.
The syntax of session formulas is given by:
 2  ::=  2 	 j : j 
1
_ 
2
j  j 3
Let  2 

and let m = j j, m > 0. For 1  k  m, let (k) denote the
k
th
element of the sequence  . The notion ; k j=
s
 is dened inductively as
follows:

; k j=
s
 i (k) j=
i
.

; k j=
s
: i ; k 6j=
s
.

; k j=
s

1
_ 
2
i ; k j=
s

1
or ; k j=
s

2
.

; k j=
s
 i k < m and ; k + 1 j=
s
.

; k j=
s
3 i there exists `  k such that ; ` j=
s
.
The dual modalities are dened as usual:
K

def
= ::, is weak, and
asserts that if there is a successor state, then that state satises . 2
def
= :3:
asserts that  is an invariant for the rest of the session.
For  2 

, we say that  j=
s
 if ; 1 j=
s
. Let Mod()
def
= f 2 

j
 j=
s
g.
Given an information system S = (; R), dene Lang(S; )
def
= f =
u
1
   u
k
2 U

j there exists  = 
0
   
k
2 Mod() such that for all j : 1 
j  k; (
j 1
; u
j
; 
j
) 2 Rg.
The main theorem of the paper follows.
Theorem 4.1 Given an information system S, a protocol Pr over alphabet
 and a formula , with jPrj = k, jj = m and jj = n, checking whether it
is the case that Pr j=  can be done in time 2
O(k+m+n)
.
The proof proceeds by associating with each formula  an automaton that
accepts not Lang(), but Lang()dY , for some appropriate nite set Y  I
such that Lang(Æ)  Lang()dY i Lang(Æ)  Lang().
The subformula closure CL of the given formula  is dened in the usual
manner, and the set X of all information terms which play a role in deter-
mining the truth of  is inferred from CL. X determines the set dX of
information states that we need to consider when evaluating . An atom is
then dened to be a pair (A; ) such that  2 dX, A is a `locally' consistent
subset of CL and for all state formulas  in A,  j=
i
. These atoms are the
states of the constructed automaton. Transitions between atoms are dened
in a straightforward manner. Having information states as part of the atoms
simplies the construction considerably.
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Note that this theorem is not at variance with results on undecidability
of cryptographic protocol verication in [DLMS99] and [CDLMS99]. This
is because this logic does not have enough expressive power to talk about
an unbounded number of new nonces, which is basically what contributes to
undecidability results in the papers mentioned above.
5 Examples of reasoning
To illustrate the kind of reasoning that goes on in the logic, we return to the
example mentoned in Section 1. This situation is similar to that which obtains
in the famous Needham Schroeder protocol, and the attack by Lowe [Low96]
on it.
Rephrasing the protocol in the syntax presented in Section 3, we have:
new
A
(x)
A! B : fxg
B
B ! A : fx
A
g
A
where Ho = fA;Bg and Ha = fCg. Note that the message B sends in line
3 is dierent from the one in the earlier version. This is because B being an
honest principal, the messages it sends are legal, and hence originate from its
database. After the rst message, B could only possibly have (fxg
B
)
A
in its
database, which after decrypting, yields x
A
.
What is the specication of this protocol ? The intention is that on ter-
mination, A and B `mutually' have the information that x holds. This may
be specied as 
1
def
= A : B : x ^ B : A : x. But, as we will see, the pro-
tocol above does not satisfy 
1
. It does achieve the much weaker formula:

2
def
= B : from
A
x.
If this requirement is seen as `liveness', we also would like an additional
`safety' requirement, that no honest principal unintentionally leaks x to an in-
truder. We thus have the specication  = 2(
^
H2Ho;D2Ha
:leak(H;D; x)) ^
3(B : from
A
x)).
The notion of H 2 Ho unintentionally leaking x to D 2 Ha may be
specied by:
leak(H;D; x)
def
= (:D : x ^D : from
H
x) ^ (H : from
D
(x _
_
A
x
A
))
The rst conjunct species that at some point of time during the session,
H sends x to D when D does not have x. The second says that H is replying
to an earlier message from D with content x or with information about having
heard x from A.
Now consider any completed session of the protocol, say Æ = 
1
: : : 
m
.
Then it contains communications say 
i
; 
j
when some variant of line 2 and
line 3 are completed, respectively. These variants are of the form A
0
! B
0
:
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fxg
B
and B
00
! A
00
: fx
A
g
A
, where A
0
is A or (C)A, B
0
is B or B(C), A
00
is
A or A(C) and B
00
is B or (C)B.
After new
A
(x), we have A : (x ^ :B : x ^ :C : x). Moreover, 2((:B :
x^:C : x)

K
((B : x

B : from
A
x)^(C : x

C : from
A
x)). Therefore,
we can argue that A
0
must be A.
After communication i, the formula (C : from
A
for
B
x) _ (B : from
A
x)
holds, and hence (C : for
B
x) _ (B : from
A
x) holds.
Now, B
00
is either B or (C)B. If it is the former, then B being an honest
principal, B : from
A
x holds, and the goal is satised. Otherwise, B
00
is (C)B.
But at i, we also have: 2(C : from
A
x

C : from
B
from
A
x). But C can
use the fact that B sends x only if B has x in its database. Therefore, at i,
2(C : from
B
from
A
x

B : from
A
x). But at j, either B : from
A
x or
C : from
A
x holds, and thus in either case B : from
A
x holds, satisfying the
goal.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the protocol does not satisfy the
safety condition. The attack mentioned in Section 1 can be formalized to show
this.
We can change the protocol in the following manner and show that the
invariant holds.
new
A
(x)
A! B : fA : xg
B
B ! A : f(A : x)
A
g
A
The other goal, namely A : B : x or even a weaker form A : B : from
A
x,
cannot be satised, since the last message meant for A can always be blocked
by C. To achieve such a goal, we need another acknowledgement.
new
A
(x)
new
B
(x)
A! B : fA : xg
B
B ! A : f(A : x)
A
; B : yg
A
A! B : f(B : y)
B
g
B
Since the last message is not possible unless A has received the previous
one, in any completed session, A has the information that B has seen x.
These examples show the diÆculty of obtaining even two `levels' of infor-
mation, of the kind: A : B : . However, weaker `levels' like A : from
B

etc are easier to achieve. This is because the protocols we study are typically
those where the content of messages are typically nonces and names. When
messages contain complex information elements, higher levels become feasi-
ble; for instance, A : (C : p
D
)
B
will hold after B sends a message about what
information it has about C.
This remark raises another issue of interest: given a protocol, under what
assumptions is a specic `level' of information achieved ? Such a logical anal-
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ysis may help in deciding patterns of communication to be followed in the
design of security protocols.
When messages are sets of several terms encrypted together, this adds to
an agent's inference capability. We saw in Section 2 how this complicates the
update rules. For instance suppose that p is local to A in  and A sends a
message ffx; pg
C
; fy; pg
D
g
B
. When A later sees p
E
, for some E, A gets the
conrmation that B has seen fx; pg
C
and fy; pg
D
, but is unsure whether C
has seen x or D has seen y. In such a state, it can be checked that the formula
A : ( from
E
p

(C : from
A
x _D : from
A
y)) holds.
6 Discussion
We have presented a model of agent's information states and a logic in which
updates on them can be reasoned about. The operators from
A
, for
A
and A :
refer to denite information that an agent has; this seems to us an essential
requirement in the context of information security. While we have atempted
to illustrate this in the context of authentication of messages, the reasoning
primitives are similar in access control models as well. In future work, we
hope to present a unied framework for both types of security properties.
We have not presented any axiomatization of validities. Of particular
interest are inference rules that let us derive protocol validities: from Pr j= 
infer Pr j=  . Obtaining a complete set of such rules seems to be quite non-
trivial. For instance, see that Pr j=  may hold without Pr j= A :  being
true for some A.
The modality A :  is closely related to, but not the same as, knowledge
modalities of the kind discussed in [FHMV95]. These epistemic modalities
refer to implicit knowledge attributed to the agent by the protocol designer,
whereas A :  represents knowledge of a more explicit kind [Ram99]. For
instance, as mentioned above, when Pr j=  holds, so would Pr j= K
A
,
whereas it may be the case that Pr 6j= A : . Formally relating these infor-
mation based modalities to epistemic ones like knowledge or belief seems an
interesting issue.
We would also like to note that the reasoning in the logic is global. An
assertion like B : from
A


A :  may well hold at a state, without A being
`aware' of it, in the sense that A : B : from
A
^:A : B : A :  may hold. An
interesting question is how much of this reasoning can be carried out locally,
and this is of importance in compositional design of security protocols.
On the modelling side, it is important to generalize the framework from
mono-sessions and interleaved sessions with hacked variants to multi-sessions,
where many agents are running many instances of the protocol simultaneously.
The ideas of [DMTY97], [Gou00] seem very relevant here. Moreover, in the
context of repeated sessions, an intruder can use past information as well,
and an extension of the logic using past modalities may be indicated for this.
Another important limitation of this approach is that principals are individual,
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whereas in the context of information security, it is important to model group
principals. A related question is to logically characterize situations where it
suÆces to study single hacker attacks and where collusions between hackers
is crucial.
References
[AG97] Abadi, M. and Gordon, A.D., \A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The
spi calculus", 4th ACM Conf. on Comp and Comm Security, ACM Press, 1997.
[Bie90] Bieber, P., \A logic of communication in a hostile environment", 3rd
Computer security foundations workshop, IEEE Press, 1990, 14-22.
[Bol97] Bolignano, D., \Towards a mechanization of cryptographic protocol
verication", CAV'97, LNCS 1254, 1997, 131-142.
[BM93] Boyd, C., and Mao, W., \On a limitation of BAN logic", Eurocrypt'93,
LNCS, 1993, 240-247.
[BAN89] Burrows, M., Abadi, M. and Needham, R., \A logic of authentication",
Proceedings of the Royal Society, 426 (1871), 1989, 233-271.
[CDLMS99] Cervesato, I., Durgin, N.A., Lincoln, P.D., Mitchell, J.C. and Scedrov,
A., \A Meta-notation for Protocol Analysis", 12-th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop, Syverson, P., editor, IEEE Computer Society Press,
1999.
[DLMS99] Durgin, N.A., Lincoln, P.D., Mitchell, J.C. and Scedrov, A., \The
undecidability of bounded security protocols", Workshop on Formal Methods
and Security Protocols (FMSP'99). Electronic proceedings available at:
http://www.cs.bell-labs.com/who/nch/fmsp99/program.html, 1999.
[DM99] Durgin, N.A. and Mitchell, J.C., \Analysis of security protocols",
Calculational System Design, Series F: Computer and System Sciences, Vol.
173, IOS Press, 1999.
[DMTY97] Debbabi, M., Mejri, M., Tawbi, N. and Yahmadi, I., \Formal automatic
verication of authentication protocols", ICFEM'97, IEEE Press, 1997.
[FHMV95] Fagin, R., Halpern, J., Moses, Y. and Vardi, M., Reasoning about
knowledge, M.I.T. Press, 1995.
[GK99] Genet, T. and Klay, F., \Rewriting for cryptographic protocol verication"
Technical report, CNET-France Telecom, 1999.
[GNY90] Gong, L., Needham, R., and Yahalom, R., \Reasoning about belief in
cryptographic protocols", IEEE Computer Security symposium, IEEE Press,
1990, 234-248.
[Gou00] Goubault-Larrecq, J., \A method for automatic cryptographic protocol
verication", IPDPS, LNCS 1800, 2000, 977-984.
102
Ramanujam, Suresh
[JRV00] Jacquemard, F., Rusinowitch, M. and Vigneron, L., \Compiling and
verifying security protocols", LPAR, LNCS 1955, 2000.
[KW96] Kindred, D. and Wing, J.M., \Fast automatic checking of security
protocols", 2nd USENIX workshop on e-commerce, 1996, 41-52.
[Low96] Lowe, G., \Breaking and xing the Needham - Schroeder public key
protocol using FD", TACAS 96, LNCS 1055, 1996, 147-166.
[MCJ97] Marrero, W., Clarke, E. M. and Jha, S., \Model checking for security
protocols", DIMACS Workshop on design and vericaton of security protocols,
1997.
[Mc94] McLean, J., \Security models", in Encyclopedia of Soft Engg, (Ed) J.
Marciniak, Wiley, 1994.
[Mea92] Meadows, C.A., \Applying formal methods to the analysis of a key
management protocol", Journal of computer security, 1(1), 1992, 5-36.
[Mo99a] Monniaux, D., \Abstracting cryptographic protocols with tree automata",
Static analysis symposium, LNCS 1694, 1999.
[Mo99b] Monniaux, D., \Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic
protocols by logics of belief", 12th computer security foundations workshop,
IEEE, 1999.
[Nes90] Nessett, D.M., \A critique of the Burrows, Abadi and Needham logic", ACM
Operating systems review, 24(2), 1990, 35-38.
[Pau98] Paulson, L., \The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols",
Journal of computer security, vol 6, 1998, 85-128.
[Ram99] Ramanujam, R., \View based explicit knowledge", Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic, vol 96, 1999, 343-368.
[SvO94] Syverson, P. F., and van Oorschot, P.C., \On unifying some cryptographic
protocol logics", 13th IEEE Symp. on security and privacy, IEEE press, 1994,
14-28.
103
Ramanujam, Suresh
104
